(Slave Freedom Movement)
Saturday, June 26, 2004
It is said that 2% of the people are needed to move a culture. I would expect that getting 5.8 million (2% of the U.S. population) signatures would not be very hard, if we are smart in getting to shopping malls, etc. Some are working to get the petition on line, as well.
The Slave Freedom United States Constitutional Amendment Petition is in, and I'll be sending out the first wave of three ring binders full of them to be filled out this week.
Kinko's put the word "Country" where it should read "County." We'll go ahead with the first wave corrected by hand and get the next computer corrected wave of petitions out to you all asap. There are 23 blank lines per page.
We'll start work on the state amendment petitions as soon as we get settled with the national petition.
The video is in its final stages of production, as well.
Thursday, June 24, 2004
Monday, June 21, 2004
My speech was taken well, and about half a dozen people asked me for the business card I told them about, which had such a profound impact on IRS Agents in Atlanta earlier this year.
I saw Bill Stegmeier and Alabama Al there, from my activites. So I met alot of new people.
It was a high class deal to eat at this place. Wolfgang Puck has a place just upstairs. Food was great! Pray for the nation. Gene.
Sunday, June 20, 2004
I contend that the payment of income taxes and property taxes constitutes a direct violation and undermines directly the Christian faith. Gene Chapman. "You [free Christians] be categorically not the literal, figurative, voluntary or involuntary slaves of men" (I Corinthians 7:23).
The IRS offers us a "voluntary" income tax because the 13th Amendment forbids "involuntary servitude"/ slavery.
I contend that there are other ways to tax for the general needs of the nation that do not conflict with the Christian faith, including the Fair Tax proposal, based on what I've seen of it.
United States v. Lee
455 U.S. 252 (1982)
Vote: 9 (Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Marshall, O’Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, White)
Opinion of the Court: Burger
Opinion concurring in judgment: Stevens
From 1970 to 1977, Edwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, employed several other Amish workers on his farm and in his carpentry shop. Contrary to federal law, he did not file quarterly Social Security tax returns, withhold Social Security taxes from his employees, or pay the employer’s share of Social Security taxes. In 1978, the Internal Revenue Service assessed Lee $27,000 for unpaid employment taxes. He made an initial $97 payment and then sued the IRS for a refund claiming that the imposition of Social Security taxes violated his First Amendment free exercise rights and those of his employees.
A lower federal court ruled in favor of Lee. It found that, since the Amish consider it sinful not to support the elderly in their communities, they oppose the Social Security system, refuse to pay Social Security taxes, and decline all Social Security benefits. Forcing the Amish to comply with the Social Security system, therefore, compelled them to engage in activity contrary to their religious beliefs. The federal government appealed this ruling.
chief justice burger delivered the opinion of the Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to determine whether imposition of social security taxes is unconstitutional as applied to persons who object on religious grounds to receipt of public insurance benefits and to payment of taxes to support public insurance funds. 450 U.S. 993 (1981). The District Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits forced payment of social security taxes when payment of taxes and receipt of benefits violate the taxpayer's religion. We reverse….
The preliminary inquiry in determining the existence of a constitutionally required exemption is whether the payment of social security taxes and the receipt of benefits interferes with the free exercise rights of the Amish. The Amish believe that there is a religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security system. Although the Government does not challenge the sincerity of this belief, the Government does contend that payment of social security taxes will not threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance. It is not within "the judicial function and judicial competence," however, to determine whether appellee or the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div. (1981). We therefore accept appellee's contention that both payment and receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith. Because the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security system interferes with their free exercise rights.
The conclusion that there is a conflict between the Amish faith and the obligations imposed by the social security system is only the beginning, however, and not the end of the inquiry. Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional…. The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest. Thomas, supra; Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972); Gillette v. United States (1971); Sherbert v. Verner (1963).
Because the social security system is nationwide, the governmental interest is apparent. The social security system in the United States serves the public interest by providing a comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits available to all participants, with costs shared by employers and employees. The social security system is by far the largest domestic governmental program in the United States today, distributing approximately $11 billion monthly to 36 million Americans. The design of the system requires support by mandatory contributions from covered employers and employees. This mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system…. Moreover, a comprehensive national social security system providing for voluntary participation would be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not impossible, to administer. Thus, the Government's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social security system is very high.
The remaining inquiry is whether accommodating the Amish belief will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest. In Braunfeld v. Brown (1961), this Court noted that "to make accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task ... because resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing ... prosecution." The difficulty in attempting to accommodate religious beliefs in the area of taxation is that "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference." Braunfeld. The Court has long recognized that balance must be struck between the values of the comprehensive social security system, which rests on a complex of actuarial factors, and the consequences of allowing religiously based exemptions. To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good…. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would "radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Braunfeld.
Unlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, it would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs. The obligation to pay the social security tax initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay income taxes; the difference--in theory at least--is that the social security tax revenues are segregated for use only in furtherance of the statutory program. There is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act. If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief…. Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
Congress has accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive national program, the practices of those who believe it a violation of their faith to participate in the social security system. In [section]1402(g) [of the Social Security Act] Congress granted an exemption, on religious grounds, to self-employed Amish and others. Confining the 1402(g) exemption to the self-employed provided for a narrow category which was readily identifiable. Self-employed persons in a religious community having its own "welfare" system are distinguishable from the generality of wage earners employed by others.
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees. Congress drew a line in 1402(g), exempting the self-employed Amish but not all persons working for an Amish employer. The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
justice stevens, concurring in the judgment.
The clash between appellee's religious obligation and his civic obligation is irreconcilable. He must violate either an Amish belief or a federal statute. According to the Court, the religious duty must prevail unless the Government shows that enforcement of the civic duty "is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."… That formulation of the constitutional standard suggests that the Government always bears a heavy burden of justifying the application of neutral general laws to individual conscientious objectors. In my opinion, it is the objector who must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special exemption from a valid law of general applicability.
Congress already has granted the Amish a limited exemption from social security taxes…. As a matter of administration, it would be a relatively simple matter to extend the exemption to the taxes involved in this case. As a matter of fiscal policy, an enlarged exemption probably would benefit the social security system because the nonpayment of these taxes by the Amish would be more than offset by the elimination of their right to collect benefits. In view of the fact that the Amish have demonstrated their capacity to care for their own, the social cost of eliminating this relatively small group of dedicated believers would be minimal. Thus, if we confine the analysis to the Government's interest in rejecting the particular claim to an exemption at stake in this case, the constitutional standard as formulated by the Court has not been met.
The Court rejects the particular claim of this appellee, not because it presents any special problems, but rather because of the risk that a myriad of other claims would be too difficult to process. The Court overstates the magnitude of this risk because the Amish claim applies only to a small religious community with an established welfare system of its own. Nevertheless, I agree with the Court's conclusion that the difficulties associated with processing other claims to tax exemption on religious grounds justify a rejection of this claim. I believe, however, that this reasoning supports the adoption of a different constitutional standard than the Court purports to apply.
The Court's analysis supports a holding that there is virtually no room for a "constitutionally required exemption" on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is entirely neutral in its general application. Because I agree with that holding, I concur in the judgment.